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L Introduction
In 1900, workers' compensation in America was a controversial, hotly
debated, allegedlyunconstitutional scheme.' Today, it is commonplace.2 Like-
wise, in 1900, imposing liability upon a product manufacturer absent privity
of contract with the injured victim was a radical suggestion.3 Today, it is the
rule.4 In 2001, despite the incredibly large settlements reached in the states'
suits against the tobacco industry, the idea of holding a person or entity liable
to a governmental entity for costs incurred by the government, arising out of
personal injuries its citizens suffered or arising out of attempts to prevent
injury, is not yet generally accepted. Will such liability be commonplace in
fifty or one hundred years, or will such suits fall by the liability wayside? Is
liability theoretically justified, or is it such a deviation from generally ac-
cepted notions of tort law that courts should refuse to impose liability? What
are the primary theoretical justifications for these governmental tort claims?
This Article will consider the legitimacy of the so-called public tort and
will examine some objections as well as justifications. In sum, while there are
bona fide philosophical and practical problems with public tort suits, there are
also good reasons for allowing such suits to go forward. In particular, the
public tort suit has a key role to play in providing efficient deterrence, as the
legal economist uses that term.
Public torts provide a mechanism that will encourage persons to take
account of all the costs posed by their activities and, therefore, to invest effi-
ciently in safety. Initially, public torts provide a vehicle that forces a defen-
dant to take account of the costs it has imposed on society, even though the
defendant's victims will not recover those costs as damages in individual tort
suits either because those individuals do not sue, or because recovery is not
allowed for reasons other than the defendant's conduct, i.e., administrative
convenience. Public tort liability may be particularly appropriate in cases in
which traditional tort concepts would not lead to liability in individual tort
suits, but in which conglomerating claims in the public suit would overcome
these traditional hurdles. Notable hurdles include the requirement of proving
cause-in-fact or legal cause in an individual tort suit. Classic conceptions of
liability and societal norms may cause a decisionmaker to balk at imposing
liability in an individual's case, whereas liability in a conglomerated claim
may be more palatable. Moreover, there may well be normative concerns that
properly deny an individual recovery, such, as the fault of the individual
1. 1 ARTHa. LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW
§ 2.07 (2000).
2. Id. § 2.08.
3. See, e.g., DANB. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 972-74 (2000) (discussing privity rule
and its subsequent decline).
4. Id.
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victim.' However, denying all recovery results in underdeterrence. Put
differently, denying recovery in all individual suits may create an externality
for the defendant. Because the defendant escapes liability in individual suits,
it will not face all of the costs of its activity and, therefore, it will not take
those costs into account when making critical decisions about engaging in the
relevant activity. Merely because the defendant should not be held liable to
the individual does not preclude some other liability-imposing device. Such
a device forces the defendant to take account of all the costs that its activity
imposes upon society. The public tort suit might be that device.
ff. Defining Public Torts
To oversimplify, a tort is a private wrong other than a breach of contract.'
The word "private" in that definition initially seems to indicate that torts
involve actions (and potentially some inactions') by one person that cause
injury to another person. Torts is the body of law in which society decides if
the person sued must make redress to the person suing, or if the person suing
is entitled to some equitable relief against the person sued in order to prevent
or stop some injury. Does a governmental entity acting and suing as a govern-
mental entity have any place in the tort mix? Or, more succinctly, should
there be such a thing as a public tort?
Interestingly, since at least the 1920s with Leon Green's work," many
commentators and courts have explained tort law in public policy terms. They
discuss the effect of imposing or refusing to impose liability on the broader
society, not just on the parties to the lawsuit. Now, it is common when dis-
cussing the "purposes" of torts law to list, among other things, deterrence,
compensation, risk spreading, avoidance of undue administrative burdens, and
respect for both judicial precedent and legislative will? These are all public
5. This justification for the public tort suit is most persuasive in those jurisdictions that
retain contributory negligence as a bar to recovery or that have adopted modified, as opposed
to pure, comparative fault Analogously, Professor Bogus has noted that there may well be
cases in which societal values see multiple parties at fault, i.e., both the producer and user of
a product In such cases, liability of the producer may be appropriate even though the product's
user is also to blame. See Carl T. Bogus, Gun Litigation andSocietal Values, 32 CONN. L. REv.
1353 (2000) (observing that paradigm allocating blame either to individual smoker or to
tobacco companies is beginning to disintegrate).
6. VICTORE. SCHWARTZET AL, PROSSER, WADE, AND ScHwARTz's TORTS 1 (2000).
7. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal
Analysis, 27 U. MIC. JL. REFORM 439 (1994) (arguing for modification of tort law to provide
for duty to act in situations where reasonable person would act altruistically).
8. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930); LEONGREENRAIONALEOFPROX-
iMATE CAUSE (1927).
9. See, e.g., William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort Greenian, as Interpreted
by Crowe Who HasBeen Influenced byMalone: A Primer, 22 LoY. L. REV. 903,906-09 (1976)
(discussing considerations for evaluating duty).
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policy ends. When one speaks of torts in public policy terms, the speaker is
being an instrumentalist;"0 she explains, decides, or justifies results based on
some greater public good. To that extent, all tort suits might be viewed as
public tort suits because they affect the broader public. However, that is too
broad a definition of the public tort for current purposes.
Alternatively, when one focuses on the sheer size of many modem tort
suits, one may be impressed by their resemblance to "public law" suits. Class
actions in product liability suits or toxic tort suits and multi-district litigation
(MDL) tort suits look more like public law suits, involving desegregation of
school systems and reform of prisons, than they look like the tort cases with
which most of us begin our basic torts classes." The big tort suit involves
many parties and extensive administrative oversight by relatively active and
engaged trial judges. Rather than sit back and rule on evidentiary matters,
jury instructions, and relevant motions, the court must be actively engaged in
the administration and management of the suit. Indeed, the modem mass tort
suit may be the descendant of the public law, institutional reform suits of the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.'
Even when allegedly tortious conduct does not give rise to a class action
or MDL certification, it still has public law aspects when it allegedly causes
injury to many people. Imagine multiple lawsuits alleging that a manufacturer
defectively designed a product when no class is certified and no MDL case is
formed. Nevertheless, concern over consistent treatment of parties in similar
cases will arise, and this concern may have a potential impact on society's
notions ofjustice, i.e., there may be a public policy side effect.
Moreover, the reality of tort law in twenty-first century America is that
at least one of the parties is a huge entity, such as a major corporation or an
insurer (albeit possibly another major corporation). In such cases, the lack of
equality between the resources that the respective sides bring to the litigation
may make the claim resemble a public lawsuit by a citizen against a govem-
mental (large) entity arguing about entitlements, equality, or treatment in
schools, hospitals, or prisons.
Although all of these points may indicate that many tort suits, including
garden-variety tort suits, are public tort suits, I use the term "public tort" in a
much narrower sense. I include as publictort suits onlythose suits in which the
10. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 48 (1995) (dislinguishing
instrumentalist and non-instrumentalist theories of law).
11. See, e.g., SCEHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 6, at 4-16 (presenting collection of core torts
cases). I began my own study of torts with an earlier edition of this frequently adopted torts
casebook.
12. I am indebted to Professor Linda Mullenix of the University of Texas School of Law,
whose observations during a post-lecture colloquia while visiting at Tennessee helped me to
recognize this relationship between modem mass tort suits and institutional reform suits of the
recent past.
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plaintiff is a governmental entity that has filed suit against a person for dam-
ages caused by that person through her allegedly tortious behavior. In most
public tort suits, the defendant will have actually caused the government some
injury, such as the expenditure of funds on public services necessitated by the
tort. However, from a pure deterrence perspective, if other citizens who
incurred damages will not recover their damages, the failure ofthe tortto cause
the government any damages should not be fatal to the government's claim
because the defendant, and others like the defendant, will not take those costs
into account when deciding what to do and how to do it. Those individual
citizens might choose not to sue or the law might not recognize their claims for
some reasonthat makes sense in the one-to-one private law framework, butthat
does not make sense ifthe goal is overall efficient deterrence.
Of course, the way I define public torts immediately brings to mind the
states' claims against tobacco manufacturers,13 the thirty-plus suits that var-
ious American cities and counties have filed against firearm manufacturers,-4
and the claims filed by foreign sovereigns against tobacco manufacturers."
These are the public tort suits ofwhich I write. One can guess the public torts
suits that lie ahead: toxic tort suits; suits against manufacturers of alcohol,
caffeine, fast food, pharmaceuticals, and lead paint; racial discrimination suits;
and more. Critically, determining the viability of the public tort suit from a
deterrence perspective depends upon the particular suit and the various factors
at issue therein. Justifying some public tort suits by their deterrent effect does
not necessarily mean that recovery is justified in every public tort suit.
Quite correctly, one might argue that many of the public tort suits filed
thus far have not been tort suits per se. Many of the state tobacco suits were
based on theories of unjust enrichment and violation of state consumer protec-
tion statutes." In fact, the tactical brilliance of such cases was that they
13. See generally Frank J. Vandall, The Legal Theory and the Viionaries thatLed to the
Proposed $368.5 Billion Tobacco Settlement, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 473 (1998) (discussing history
of tobacco litigation).
14. See generally Frank J. Vandall, O.K Corral ff: Policy Issues in Municipal Suits
Against Gun Manufacturers, 44 VffL. L. REV. 547 (1999) (addressing economic cause-in-fact
and proximate cause policy issues in gun litigation); Note, Recovering the Costs of Public
Nuisance Abatement The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1521 (2000) (analyzing claims embedded in municipal claims against gun manufacturers);
Developments, The Paths of Civil Litigation, Part 1I- The Use of the Public Nuisance in Tort
Against the Hand Gun Industry, 113 HARV.L.REV. 1752,1758-59 (2000) [hereinafterPathsof
Civil Litigation] (describing municipal suits against tobacco firms and handgun manufacturers
as novel forms of collectivization).
15. See, e.g., Republic of Guatemala v. Tobacco Institute, No. 98-1185 (D.D.C.); Repub-
lic of Nicaragua v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 99-1535 (D.D.C.); Ukraine v. Am. Brands, No. 99-
3080 (D.D.C.); In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig., MDL Docket No. 1279.
16. See generally Vandall, supra note 13. See also Anne Giddings Kimball & Sarah L.
Olson, Municipal Firearm Litigation: Ill Conceivedfrom Any Angle, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1277,
1280-88 (2000) (analyzing claims made in municipal lawsuits against gun manufacturers).
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avoided the difficulties inherent in subrogation claims. By basing their right
to recover in restitution, the states were able to claim that they were not subject
to defenses available against individual smokers, such as victim fault (i.e., con-
tributory negligence, comparative negligence, and assumption of risk).' I wil
return to this point extensively below; however, it is important to point out that
although some governmental suits, including some public tort suits, may not
look like tort suits from the pleadings, these suits arise out of personal injury
or the threat of personal injury. Specifically, they arise out ofpersonal injury
suffered by or threatened to the populace and out of conduct that is allegedly
tortious. These suits involve many of the same policies at stake in tort law:
deterrence, compensation, risk spreading, and normative notions of fault and
blame. As such, these policies are directly relevant to these suits. Conse-
quently, it is critical to analyze these cases as public tort suits. Tactical bril-
liance and legal ingenuity in coming up with creative theories, such as unjust
enrichment, should not shield these suits from analysis under the principles we
have come to apply to tort law. In fact, when so analyzed, there are strong
reasons grounded in deterrence to recognize and justify public tort suits.
Many of the firearm public tort suits include traditional tort claims. The
claims include negligence and strict product liability in tort." These are run-
of-the-mill tort claims that do not require the torts teacher to consult her
colleagues teaching remedies. Before turning to some objections and then
justifications for public tort suits, in the next Part, I provide some tort analo-
gies to the current round of public tort suits.
Ill. Public Tort Suit Analogies
A. The Public Nuisance Claim
Perhaps the clearest analogy to the public tort suit is the public nuisance
claim. A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common
to the public. 9 For example, the earliest public nuisance likely involved some-
one blocking a road. Public authorities, such as state or local governments,
have the right to sue to abate a public nuisance.20 Governments have used the
theory of nuisance to deal with many intrusions on the public good, such as
17. Vandall, supra note 13, at 477-80.
18. Kimball & Olson, supra note 16, at 1280-81. For a catalogue and analysis ofthe claims
in the firearms suits, mostly rejecting liability, see Scott R. Preston, Targeting the Gun Industry:
Municipalities to Hold Manufacturers Liable for Their Products andActions, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J.
595 (2000) (examining successes and failures in municipal litigation against gun manufacturers).
See also Amanda B. Hill, Ready Aim, Sue: The Impact of Recent Texas Legislation on Gun
Manufacturer Liability, 31 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1387 (2000) (detailing theories of liability in
municipal litigation against gun manufacturers and legislative responses to such suits).
19. REsTATmAENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 821(B); DOBBS, supra note 3, at 1334.
20. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 1335.
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houses of prostitution, sources of pollution, drug houses, and gangs.2" States
have filed public nuisance actions against entities in neighboring states to
enjoin pollution.' In their firearm suits, many cities alleged public nuisance
claims, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.'
An excellent article, Recovering the Costs ofPublic NuisanceAbatement:
The Public and Private City Sue the Gun Industry,24 points out that the public
nuisance claims in firearm suits are, in fact, three separate claims seeking three
separate types of relief. The claims are for (1) damages the cities have suffered
in their private, proprietary capacity, (2) damages the cities have suffered in
their public or governmental capacities, and (3) injunctive relief.' The first
claim is based on the rule that a private person can sue for damages caused by
a public nuisance if, but only if, she has suffered some special harm - an injury
that is different in kind (not just degree) from the injuries suffered by society
at large.26 Thus, if a city suffers damage in its proprietary (private) capacity
that is different in kind from the injury that the public as a whole suffers,
recovery would be appropriate. For instance, holes in public buildings from
gun fights might satisfy the different in kind requirementY Claims based on
bullet holes in public buildings, however, are standard tort claims for property
damage. The bullet hole damage is akin to the asbestos abatement costs public
entities incurred and sought to recover from asbestos producers. Although
property damages ought to be recoverable, they are not particularly interesting
for present purposes. They are not recovery ofexpenditures for public services
resulting from personal injury, nor are they recovery of damages suffered by,
but not recovered or recoverable by, individual citizens."
The second public nuisance theory or claim in the firearm suits is for
recovery of public expenditures. This second claim demands particular atten-
tion in the analysis of public tort suits and I turn to it below. Of particular
relevance is the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in City of Flagstaffv.
21. Paths ofCivilLitigation, supra note 14, at 1764.
22. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915) (alleging that defendants
discharged noxious gasses in Tennessee which traveled over state lines and destroyed vegetation
in Georgia).
23. See David Kairys, The Governmental Handgun Cases and theElements and Underly-
ing Policies of Public Nuisance Law, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1175, 1175-81 (2000) (discussing
elements of municipal claims in context of traditional public nuisance law).
24. Note, supra note 14.
25. Id. at 1527-38.
26. See id. at 1527 (discussing grounds for public nuisance claims by municipalities
against gun manufacturers).
27. Id. at 1528.
28. The author of Recovering the Costs of Public Nuisance Abatement points out that
some courts have been willing to interpret the state's proprietary interest broadly. Note, supra
note 14, at 1528-29.
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Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,29 authored by Justice Kennedy while
serving on that court.30 In City of Flagstaff the court held that under Arizona
law, a city, as plaintiff, could not recover emergency expenditures arising out
ofthe evacuation ofan area after a train derailment.3 ' The court in City ofFlag-
staff did, however, recognize a critical exception to its own no recovery rule.
Recovery of municipal expenditures might be recoverable in a public nuisance
action seeking abatement of the nuisance.3 ' This exception threatens to swal-
low the rule. One wonders if slight doctrinal differences between tort theories
should govern a policy-oriented analysis of recovery. Some argue that, in any
event, a public entity should not be able to recover damages occasioned by a
public nuisance.
From a policy perspective, the ostensible rule in City of Flagstaff, which
states that public service or response costs are not recoverable in a municipal
tort suit, is akin to the economic harm rule. The economic harm rule provides
that no one is liable in negligence (or product liability) for purely economic
loss.33 Although I discuss the rule below, it is important to note that the
economic harm rule is riddled with exceptions.
The third public nuisance theory or claim in the municipal firearm suits
is the claim for injunctive relief. This is not really a claim as much as it is a
remedy for a public nuisance. There is authority for allowing a public entity
to successfully seek an injunction against a public nuisance. One may justi-
fiably wonder why an injunction should be viewed differently than damages.
If an injunction is, in fact, merely a remedy for the public nuisance, then why
should there be a rule which states that another remedy - a certain type of
damages - is unavailable as a matter of law? Certainly, a court considering
an injunction ordering abatement would undertake the familiar balancing
process to determine the appropriate remedy. But should the law totally deny
29. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
30. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 322, 324; see also City of Philadelphia v. Beretta, U.S.A, 126 F. Supp. 2d 882,
894-95 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Note, supra note 14, at 1524 n.19 (citing additional relevant cases).
33. DoBBs, supra note 3, at 488-89.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 89-94 (discussing rule, its exceptions, and its rela-
tionship to public torts). In Camden Counp Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta USA.
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d245 (D.NJ. 2000), the court refused to dismiss plaintiff's public nuisance
claim on the ground that plaintiff sought recovery of municipal expenditures, noting the City of
Plagstaff abatement exception. Id. at 265-66. However, the court still dismissed the plaintiff's
public nuisance claim, reasoning that the defendants did not have control over the nuisance. Id.
at 266. Of particular relevance to the court on the control issue was the fact that the wrong suf-
fered would not have occurred absent the wrongdoing of third persons. Id. This is a proximate
cause/remoteness type of analysis.
35. Note, supra note 14, at 1536-38.
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the damages remedy for public nuisance? Ironically, by denying damages but
allowing injunction, the law may push courts to impose the more draconian
remedy - an injunction that prohibits the alleged conduct. In fact, the unavail-
ability of damages may make the legal remedy inadequate, thereby justifying
the injunction.
Making damages unavailable deprives the trial court of the power to
govern the state/defendant relationship with what Calabresi and Melamed caU
a "liability rule."36 The no-damages-but-injunction rule is a property rule
under which the defendant if it chooses to continue the prohibited behavior,
must negotiate with the plaintiff to purchase the right to do so.' Transaction
costs may make it impossible to successfuly conclude such a negotiation,
even though it would be the efficient result. Under the no-damage-but-injunc-
tion rule, the defendant - if it chooses to try and continue to engage in the
prohibited behavior- must purchase that right from the plaintiff." But, from
whom may the defendant "purchase" that right? From the executive who
instituted the suit? From the legislature by lobbying for the passage ofprotec-
tive legislation? The problems inherent in injunctive relief suggest that dam-
ages may actually be simpler for defendants to deal with and for courts to
administer. These problems demonstrate why the public tort claim for dam-
ages cries out for theoretical analysis."'
B. Parens Patriae and Other Analogies
Other analogies to the new public tort suit include governmental suits
under environmental statutes to recover cleanup costs and suits seeking dam-
ages for violation of antitrust or consumer protection laws. States may prose-
cute such suits as parens patriae or parent ofthe country.40 However, that little
bit of Latin should not be used to obscure the obvious fact that the state must
first have some claim, i.e., that the defendant committed or was alleged to have
36. Guido Calabresi &A. Douglas Melamed,PropertyRules, LiabilityRules and Inalien-
abiliy: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972).
37. See id. (noting types of societal rules for protecting and enforcing entitlements).
38. Id.
39. Arguably, injunction claims for individual clients may not be efficient deterrents,
given the reality of civil litigation in America. Tort suits are prosecuted by lawyers whose fee
is paid out of the recovery under a contingency fee agreement Many lawyers representing
governmental entities do so on at least a partial contingent fee basis. An injunction does not
produce a fund out of which plaintiffs' lawyers may recover a contingent fee (absent some fee
shifting statute). Arguably, plaintiffs' lawyers prefer to represent plaintiffs in damages actions,
rather than in suits seeking equitable relief. A rule that allows for the issuance of an injunction,
but not for damages, could mean that an inefficiently low number of suits seeking injunctions
will be prosecuted. Therefore, defendants will engage in the tortious behavior because they
know they will probably not have to respond in damages nor face an action in injunction.
40. See, e.g., Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).
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committed some legally cognizable wrong. Moreover, although a state may be
able to sue as parens patriae, a city or other governmental entity may not."
Whatever a theory might indicate about the viability of the city's claim, local
law must be considered in determining the governmental entity's standing to
assert the claim. This paper is not about those municipal law issues; rather, it
is about the theoretical bona fides ofthe public tort suit. Thus, inthe following
Part, I consider some objections to the public tort suit.
1IV Some Preliminary Objections to the Public Tort Suit
A. The No Change Fear
One initial objection to the public tort suit is that it is different from other
tort suits and, as such, it should be viewed with suspicion. Whether we admit
it or not, lawyers are a relatively conservative group. Lawyers distrust whole-
sale change. The nature of the common law system is that previous cases and
rules are treated as precedent. They are not followed when found distinguish-
able. Only rarely does a court overrule its prior decisions, usually doing so
after distinguishable situations arise and begin to form a cohesive body of con-
flicting authority. In the civil law system, courts must act cautiously because
the will ofthe legislature is supreme. Legislation is the primary source of law.
But, while lawyers are cautious and, indeed, conservative, lawyers also
know that the law must respond to the needs of the society it orders. Perhaps
it need not be totally flexible, but it certainly cannot be rigid.42 The develop-
ment of personal injury law in the twentieth century - workers' compensation,
strict product liability in tort, the general reasonableness standard in negli-
gence, the Learned Hand formula and its widespread influence, comparative
fault, and the move to and away from joint and several liability - evidence
modem and post-modem tort law's adaptation to changing times, economics,
and values. Courts, after all, exist to decide cases that arise in particular
social contexts. As such, the objection to the public tort suit as different from
other tort suits seems unpersuasive.
B. Corrective Justice and the Public Tort Suit
One might argue that because the public tort suit is so different from
other tort suits, it is inconsistent with notions of corrective justice inherent in
private law and tort law. Some corrective justice theories of torts depend
upon an academic knowledge of philosophy that few lawyers, judges, or (I
confess) law professors possess.
41. Note, supra note 14, at 1527.
42. See Timothy D. Lytton, LawsuitsAgainst the Gun Industy: A Comparative Institu-
tionalAnaysis, 32 CoNN. L. REV. 1247, 1266-73 (2000) (analyzing how initial framing of key
issues - such as scope of duty - can often be outcome determinative).
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In The Idea of Private Law, Ernest Weinrib sets forth one of the most
comprehensive, complete, and compelling corrective justice theories. 3 Wein-
rib argues that tort law, and all private law, ought to be logically coherent.'
It must explain itself. Thus, pointing to distributive justice goals outside the
bipolar (plaintiffvs. defendant) tort case that affects one party, such as deter-
rence (defendant)46 or risk spreading (plaintiff and society),47 are not persua-
sive justifications for legal rules. They are not persuasive because, to para-
phrase, they are not fair. They are not fair because they do not adequately
explain the result in the case as it affects both parties. Thus, there is no log-
ical coherence in a rule explained in reference to a policy that effects either
one party or society as a whole, but not both parties.
To restate a Weinribian corrective justice theory of tort law in even more
oversimplified terms, tort cases ought to involve one person against another
person. In tort cases, the first person (the plaintiff) seeks redress for some
wrong caused or threatened by the second person (the defendant). The litiga-
tion focuses on those two people and their actions. That focus allows for an
application of the law - i.e., fault, cause, damages, defenses - to the particular
facts and equities of a specific case. Thus, the system achieves a result that
is fair or just to the parties before the court.
Justifying recovery in terms of some broader societal good, however,
may sacrifice justice or fairness between the parties. For instance, suppose a
court imposes liability in order to deter the defendant and others similarly
situated. The defendant, not the plaintiff, is the focus of the deterrence. Thus,
deterrence might point toward liability, even when society views the plaintiff
as undeserving. In fact, deterrence might point toward liability when the
injury was only threatened, but not incurred.4" Alternatively, focusing on
compensation highlights the plaintiff, but not the defendant. Compensation
43. WERIB, supra note 10, at 48. Weinrib's theory is, of course, only one theory of cor-
rective justice.
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. Professor Weinrib states the following: "For ajuridical relationship to be coherent,
its component features must come together not through the operation of something beyond them
that brings them together but because they are conceptually connected in such a way that, in
some sense still to be explained, they intrinsically belong together." Id. Later, Professor Weinrib
notes, "For a private law relationship to be coherent, the consideration that justifies any feature
of that relationship must cohere with the considerations that justify every other feature of it.
Coherence is the interlocking into a single integrated justification of all the justificatory consid-
erations that pertain to ajuridical relationship." Id. at 32.
46. See id. at 46-48 (criticizing economic analysis of private law).
47. See id. at 36-38 (arguing that question of who is at fault is distinct from question of
who can best spread risk).
48. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,AugmentedAwards The Effieient Evolution
ofPunitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 20-23 (1990) (discussing factthat from efficiency view-
point, payment of compensatory damages to injured plaintiffs is not necessary).
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1019 (2001)
might favor liability even when society would not otherwise find fault with
the defendant's conduct. A public tort suit, however, moves the focus away
from the facts of the particular or individual case. The issues and arguments
are too big and are by their nature based on distributive justice concerns such
as deterrence and risk spreading.
Several responses are apparent to this particular corrective justice objec-
tion. First, correctivejustice theories may notbe easily accessible to thejudges
and lawyers who actually deal with tort suits orto the legislators who pass tort-
related statutes. This is a somewhat unfair and anti-intellectual response
because I rely on my own intellectual shortcomings and assumptions about
many judges and lawyers to mitigate the impact of their theoretically brilliant
work. However, for a theory to gain widespread adoption, it must usually be
broadly accessible.
Second, the corrective justice theory is not reflective of our post-millen-
nium reality. Courts do consider concepts like deterrence, compensation,
administrative convenience, and risk spreading when deciding tort cases.49
Modem tort law and economic analysis oftort law are based on the notion that
deterrence works. In Aristoteleanterms, courts do consider distributive justice
when deciding tort cases and when articulating the "rules" of tort law.
Another related objection to the public tort suit is based on the nature of
the adversary system and on the lawyer's role in that system; it points to the
importance of the narrative in developing law and persuading legal decision
makers. Lawyers tell stories in developing their clients' cases. Stories are
better when based on actual human experience. Telling a person's story, and
encouraging the decisionmaker to understand or to empathize, is the best way
to humanize a client's plight. However, it is difficult to turn the public tort suit
into a compelling story about a sympathetic party. Ofcourse, the answer to this
argument is that the public tort suit may present a challenge to the litigator. So
be it."0
Yet another objection rooted in corrective justice is related to what might
be viewed as one of the public tort suit's inherent strengths: the public tort
suit is a way for the plaintiff/governmental entity to avoid defenses available
against individualiplaintiffs. For instance, inthe tobacco suits, the states sought
to recover under unjust enrichment theories. They did not seek to recover
through subrogation, in part because subrogation claims would have exposed
the states to defenses such as assumption of risk and plaintiff negligence.
These defenses were available against the people who used tobacco and suf-
49. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 3, oh. 1.
50. Realistically, the public tort suit may trigger values and themes that are not as relevant
in individual suits. The lawyer's story will highlight these values and themes rather than those
emphasized in the individual suit See generally Bogus, supra note 5, at 1359-72 (discussing
role of societal values in tobacco litigation outcomes).
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fered injuries, thus causing the states to expend the funds sought as recovery
in their suits. Some commentators claim that bypassing individual victims'
defenses is somehow unfair because it excuses the personal injury victim from
fault or responsibility. I shall return to this objection below, where I argue that
individual recovery should be denied while governmental entity recovery ought
to be permitted. Denying individual recovery may be consistent with our cor-
rectivejustice notions offault and blame. Allowing public entity recovery pro-
vides deterrence without sacrificing correctivejustice ideals in individual suits.
C. The Economic Harm Rule
The last objection arises out of the economic harm rule. Governmental
entities in public tort suits seek, in part, to recover pure economic loss. To the
extent a governmental entity does not seek to recover property damage (i.e.,
building damage in a gun suit), the government entity seeks to recover money
that would not otherwise have been expended (i.e., medical services, welfare
expenditures, increased police or ambulance expenditures). It is hombooklaw
(with some rather large exceptions) that in strict liability or negligence cases
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover purely economic loss."' Should govern-
mental entities be able to escape this rule? I foreshadowmy answer bypointing
out that in several other contexts, I have criticized the economic harm rule.52
It also bears emphasis that the economic harm rule does not bar recovery in
wrongful death cases, many professional malpractice cases, non-personal
injury misrepresentation cases, or interference with contract cases. Logically,
if theory or fairness justify recovery of purely economic loss, the economic
loss should be recovered.
V The Legitimacy of the Public Tort Suit - Deterrence
A. An Explanation of Deterrence
Given these objections to the public tort suit, what can be said for it? Its
primary justification lies in the deterrence function of tort law.5' From an
economic perspective, the law ought to encourage people to act efficiently.
Forcing people to take account of, or at least to consider, all the costs oftheir
proposed activity (or the method of engaging in that activity) will lead to
efficient investments in safety. The public tort suit may help to insure efficient
investments in safety if it can force actors to take account of costs they would
51. DoBBs, supra note 3, at 488-89.
52. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Contortions Along the Boundaries Between Contracts
and Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457,512-20 (1994) (discussing economic harm rule); Galligan, supra
note 48, at 43-63 (same).
53. Admittedly, deterrence is a function of tort law that Professor Weinrib may reject
See generally Weinrib, supra note 10.
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otherwise ignore because existing legal rules do not provide liability for those
costs. An explanation follows, beginning with a theory of general deterrence.
To the economist, when a person decides what to do and how to do it,
the person will consider both the costs and benefits of his proposed action. The
person will invest or produce up to the point where the marginal benefit of
the last unit produced equals that last unit's marginal cost. If the costs the
person faces are not accurate because they are too low, the person will overpro-
duce because he will face a lower than actual marginal cost curve. A cost
which the person faces or imposes, but which he does not pay, is called an
externality.
54
In deciding whether to make investments in production, a person must
consider all costs of a proposed action. These costs include the accident costs
imposed upon society by the proposed activity. This truism is the basis of
Learned Hand's negligence formula; one is negligent if the pre-event burden
B of avoiding a loss is less than the pre-event probability P of the event times
the pre-event expected loss L.5" That is, one is negligent if B < P x L.
The idea that a person should account for all of the costs caused by its
proposed activity, including accident costs, is the basis for Judge Guido Cala-
bresi's masterpiece, The Costs of Accidents.56 Internalization of accident
costs, or at least the threat of paying those costs, is necessary to encourage
efficient investments in safety.
If legal rules do not force a person to take account of all the costs of a
particular action, then legal rules will not lead to efficient investments in
safety. Instead, they will lead to underinvestments in safety or overinvestments
in relevant activity. In order to encourage efficient investments in safety, legal
rules should force actors to take account ofthe costs oftheir activities. Public
tort liability against defendants who otherwise would not be forced by prevail-
ing legal rules to take account of all of the accident costs of their activities
might produce an overall efficiency gain.
B. Applying a General Deterrence Theory to the Public Tort Suit
How might the theory of deterrence justify the public tort suit? Initially,
there are several reasons to believe that current legal rules do not force actors
to consider all the costs that their activities might cause. Some are the same
economic reasons that might justify an award of punitive damages (or aug-
54. See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 42, at 1249-50 (arguing that there may be market failures
in certain firearms markets). See also Bogus, supra note 5, at 1367-72 (examining externalities
in context of tobacco litigation); Frank J. Vandall, Economic and Causation Issues in City Suits
Against Gun Manufacturers, 27 PEPI. L. REv. 719 (2000) (examining economic implications
of municipalities' suits against gun manufacturers).
55. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947).
56. GuiDO CALABREs, TE CosTs oF ACcIDENTS (1970).
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mented awards).51 Others are more closely tied to the nature of-the public tort
suit and the ways in which it is different from the traditional bipolar tort suit.
Some of the reasons relate to damages that individuals suffer but that they do
not recover. Others relate to damages that the defendant's conduct causes the
governmental entity to suffer.
1. All Those Injured May Not Sue or May Not Recover
Borrowing an insight from Dorsey Dan Ellis, Jr.'s analysis of punitive
damages, all people who are injured might not sue.5 To the extent that
injured people do not sue - and to the extent that actors anticipate that all
those injured will not sue - the relevant actors face potential damage awards
that are less than the actual accident costs caused by their activities. There-
fore, the rational actor will underinvest in safety and/or will overproduce. If
a governmental entity could recover losses suffered by those who did not sue,
there would be an efficiency gain as long as the costs of the governmental
entity's suit were less than the deterrence gain from prosecuting the suit.
Why might people decide not to sue for their losses? The losses may be
so small to any one person that the costs of suit, including opportunity costs,
would make it too expensive or too much trouble to sue. Although individual
claims might be small, pooling small losses may result in a significant total
loss. However, one way to pool losses is to allow the state to do the pooling.
The small claim pooling justification for the public tort suit may also
apply to class actions and punitive damages claims. But, in the class action
arena, administrative costs are arguably higher than in state suits. The costs
of notifying class members of their rights and of the progress of the suit, as
well as the costs of the distribution of the proceeds of the suit, are present in
class actions but not in the public tort suit. In the public tort suit, there is no
problem with certification, opt-outs, or complex distribution procedures. In
the classic punitive damages suit, all punitive damages go to one private
plaintiff. He or she receives a windfall. Although that fact is not terribly
critical from a deterrence perspective, it is a windfall nonetheless, with
accompanying moral concerns (such as, did the plaintiff deserve this wind-
fall?). It is true that in the public tort suit, the government would recover for
losses suffered by others under the small claim justification; but the govern-
ment would, by definition, use the recovered funds for public purposes subject
to the pressures and controls of the democratic process.
57. See generally Galligan, supra note 48 (analyzing theoretical basis and practical effects
of punitive damages schemes).
58. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efflciency in the Law ofPunitive Damages, 56 S.
CAL. L. Ray. 1 (1982).
59. Galligan, supra note 48, at 58.
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Additionally, injured persons may not sue ifthey have some moral objec-
tion to the legal process or if they have been killed by the defendant's actions
and have no statutorily designated survivors to prosecute their claims. 60 The
existence of this death category depends upon the local law governing wrong-
ful death and survival actions. Once again, if all those injured do not sue, then
the potential defendant faces less than full accident costs and will not be effec-
tively deterred when behaving rationally (i.e., seeking to maximize profits).
The public tort suit can provide a vehicle to encourage efficient investments in
safety.
In the public tort context, an injured person who suffers injury and then
relies upon social welfare for medical expenditures and/or costs of living may
have little incentive to sue. The state that provides the social benefits suffers
the loss. If the state is not allowed to sue, then the defendant has no incentive
to consider the benefits' cost in its behavior calculus. Intuitively, those with-
out significant wage losses or without real access to justice might be less likely
to sue than those high wage earners who feel comfortable with the American
judicial system.
Recall now the decision in City of Flagstaff, in which the court held that
municipal recovery costs are not cognizable in a tort case (other than perhaps,
a public nuisance, abatement case).61 In City ofFlagstaff, the city sued for its
own losses.62 However, the decision also seems to apply where the govern-
ment entity sues as proxy for losses suffered by another.
The court's conclusion was based upon the following reverse risk spread-
ing theory:
Although precedent on the point is limited, we conclude that the cost of
public services for protection from fire or safety hazards is to be borne by
the public as a whole, not assessed against the tortfeasor whose negligence
creates the need for the service. See City ofBridgetonv. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146
N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49(1976). Where such services areprovidedby
the government and the costs are spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not
expect a demand for reimbursement. This is so even thoughthe tortfeasor
is fully aware thatprivate parties injuredby its conduct, who cannot spread
their risk to the general public, will have a cause of action against it for
damages proximately or legally caused.'
The logic seems to be that if the governmental entity has decided to bear some
loss and to spread it through taxes, then the government cannot seek to recover
the loss from the entity that created the necessity for the expenditure in the first
60. See DoBBS, supra note 3, at 814 (discussing statutory limitations on beneficiaries).
61. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322,323-24 (9th
Cir. 1983).
62. Id. at 323.
63. Id.
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place. However, a governmental entity's decision to pay a cost and to then
spread it through the vehicle of taxes or assessments does not deter the entity
that imposed the cost in the first place.' By paying the cost, the government
makes no obvious decision to forego ultimate recovery and/or deterrence.
Thus, the court's decision is rather unconvincing on this point. Perhaps
recognizing this problem, the court stated that a contrary holding would upset
the expectations of business entities.65 Presumably, the expectation that would
be disappointed is the expectation that the defendant would not be liable to the
government for its conduct. But should that expectation be protected ifit is the
result of an externality (i.e., an expectation that the defendant will not have to
pay all of the costs that its activity imposes on society)? Arguably not, unless
society is willing to forego the deterrence provided by that liability.
The City of Flagstaff court recognized:
Settled expectations sometimes must be disregarded where new tort
doctrines are required to cure an unjust allocation of risks and costs. See
MacPhersonv. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916);
Escolav. Coca-ColaBottling Co., 24 Cal.2d453,150P.2d436 (1944). The
argument for the imposition of the new liability is not so compelling, how-
ever, where afair and sensible systemfor spreading the costs of an accident
is already in place, even if the alternate scheme proposed mightbe a more
precise one. Here the city spreads the expense of emergency services to its
taxpayers, an allocation which is neither irrational nor unfair."
But why should the existence of a cost-spreading regime justify not imposing
that cost on the wrongdoer for deterrence purposes? The answer is not clear.
In fact, parties insure against risks all the time as a means of spreading costs.
Frequently thereafter, the first party insurer that paid the loss will seek recov-
ery from a tortfeasor through subrogation. Inthe worker compensation arena,
certain accident costs are spread through worker compensation insurance, but
by statute or judicial decision, the employer or the compensation insurer is
allowed to recover the amounts it has paid to an injured worker from a non-
immune tortfeasor who caused the injuries.' These are examples of situations
in which there is a risk spreading vehicle or device, but tort recovery is still
allowed against a third party tortfeasor.'
64. But see Kimball& Olson, supra note 16, at 1296-1301 (exploring rationales support-
ing policy of barring cost recovery for public services).
65. City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 323.
66. Id.
67. LARsON & LARSON, supra note 1, chs. 116 & 122.
68. See Kimball & Olson, supra note 16, at 1299-1300 (analogizing rule that municipality
cannot recover public service costs as damages to firefighter's rule). That so-called rule provides
that firefighters or police officers (and possibly other public servants) cannot recover for the
injuries that they suffer when responding to a negligently caused emergency from the person
whose negligence caused the emergency. At face value - even ignoring its many exceptions -
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Thus, there are reasons for allowing either an augmented awards claim
or a public tort suit based on the fact that someone has suffered a compensable
injury but chooses not to sue. In this regard, the augmented awards plaintiff
or the governmental plaintiff asserts a type of derivative claim - derivative of
the injured individual's rights. Kimball and Olson rely upon what they call
the "doctrine of remoteness" to argue that derivative claims should not be
allowed.69 Although I discuss the so-called doctrine of remoteness below, it
is important to recognize that an externality arises if the public tort claim is
not allowed to go forward and no one else brings, or is allowed to bring, the
claim. The defendant will not be forced to take account of all the costs of its
activities. Not allowing recovery leads to underinvestments in safety. Thus,
the defendant will be underdeterred.
An additional economic reason that mayjustify the public tort is that even
if all those injured sue, certain types of damages may not be recoverable for
reasons ofjudicial efficiency.70 I have written about such claims elsewhere as
a possible justification for augmented awards (or punitive damages)." For
example, in significant part, administrative convenience justified the classic
rule disallowing negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. One reason
for the traditional no-recovery rule was the difficulty of quantifying the losses.
It was hard for courts to decide whether the plaintiff's losses were real or
sufficiently significant to justify recovery in particular cases. Another facet of
the original no-recovery rule was that courts feared a flood of claims. Fromthe
perspective of the potential defendant, real but uncollectible damages for
emotional distress were an externality. Although the defendant caused emo-
tional distress damages, it was not legally required to take them into account
it is not a persuasive analogy. First, the firefighter's rule is occasionally rooted in the assumption
of risk theory. In the public tort suit there is little to suggest that the public entity assumes the
risk of liability merely by providing benefits to the citizen victims of the defendant's tort.
Secondly, the firefighter's rule is based upon the notion that the public servant receives liberal
worker compensation benefits and, therefore, should not recover in tort for negligence. There
is an implied bargain between the firefighter and the community for which the public servant
toils. There is no similar implied bargain apparent between the public torifeasor and the
governmental plaintiff. In White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821-22 (N.D. Ohio
2000), the court rejected the firefighter's rule as a basis to bar municipal plaintiffs from recover-
ing the costs of dealing with firearm violence. See also Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freehold-
ers v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 245, 260 n.10 (D.N.J. 2000) (noting that New Jersey
had abolished fireman's rule).
69. Kimball & Olson, supra note 16, at 1288-96.
70. These are not derivative claims per se because there is no one who is allowed to bring
them. These types of claims are only derivative in the sense that they seek to recover for an
injury suffered by another who is not allowed to sue. Thus, the individual who suffered the
injury is not in an economically preferable position to prosecute the claim. Cf Kimball & Olson,
supra note 16, at 1288-96 (discussing claims barred by remoteness despite fact that claimants
suffered some injury related to tortious conduct in question).
71. See generally Galligan, supra note 48 (discussing evolution of punitive schemes).
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in its decisionmaking. Arguably, the result was inefficient behavior. Some
device whereby those injuries could be estimated and collected, if tortiously
caused, provided an efficiency gain if the device's cost was less than both the
efficiency gain and the administrative costs of individual actions. Of course,
in the emotional distress arena, the response has not been public tort suits or
augmented awards. Rather, it has been a rejection of the original rule and
increased efforts to provide rules that separate legitimate and illegitimate
claims. The proverbial jury is still out on the effectiveness and efficiency of
those rules.
In any event, the point is that in certain types of cases, the costs of liti-
gation may be too high to justify allowing individual claims to be pursued for
certain types of injuries, even though we know that these injuries occur.
Failing to allow recovery by anyone only serves to understate the total costs
of the activity to the defendant. A vehicle or device, such as the public tort
suit, whereby a defendant would be forced to take account of those costs
without an inordinate administrative burden, provides a deterrence gain.
Relatedly, courts and legislatures have limited the classes ofplaintiffs that
can recover for certain relational injuries. Wrongful death or consortium
plaintiffs are a limited group of close and sometimes financially dependent
relatives of the decedent or injured person. However, others do suffer loss. In
a state where the applicable wrongfil death law does not allow a parent to
recover for a child's wrongful death if the deceased child has a spouse or
children, the parent's real loss will go uncompensated. The defendant who
does not have to pay those damages will not consider them in deciding whether
and how to act. Thus, the defendant will behave inefficiently. A public tort
suit (or augmented awards to those who can recover) might provide efficient
deterrence, although one wonders if allowing such recovery when the legisla-
ture has not extended recovery is an abrogation of legislative will.
Presently, I turn to another, perhaps more concrete, example. Many states
have enacted various damages caps. By their nature, these caps threaten to
create externalities and consequent under-deterrence, resulting in too many
injuries. For example, many states have enacted caps on liability (at least for
certain types of damages) in medical malpractice actions. 2 Assuming a hypo-
thetical $500,000 cap, anyone who suffered injuries over $500,000 atthe hands
of a negligent health care provider would be under-compensated and health
care providers in general would be under-deterred. However, one might argue
that codes of professional ethics and professional values adequately provide
sufficient incentives to health care providers to care for their patients. That is,
the normative aspects of professional ethics and culture might have a deterrent
effect that offsets at least some of the deterrence lost as a result of the cap.
72. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 384 (discussing capping statutes and other devices that
limit damage recovery).
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However, pushing the inquiry one step further, if individuals or entities not
bound by the health providers' professional ethics play a key role in deciding
how much to invest in treatment, the professional code or culture will be less
significant in offsetting the externality caused by the cap. Thus, insurers or
health maintenance organizations will, when deciding what treatment to
authorize, considerthattheirpotentialliability cap is $500,000. The normative
suasion of medical professional ethics will not operate on the business person
untrained in, or uninfluenced by, those ethics and values. A public tort suit
against the corporate entity would provide a deterrence gain while keeping the
cap intact vis-a-vis the individual health care provider. The deterrence gain
could also be provided by recognizing individual tort claims against the
corporate actor and/or by allowing augmented awards to individual actors.
Although the individual suit would more appropriately fulfill the compensa-
tory function of tort law, the benefit of the public tort suit is that it could
conglomerate all such claims, thus creating a single large claim rather than
many smaller ones.
2. Appropriate Limitations on Individual Recovery Do Not Necessarily
Apply to Public Tort Suits - Preserving Corrective Justice and Deterrence
I now turn to another set of deterrence justifications for public tort suits.
These justifications rely upon the very differences between the public tort suit
and the traditional bipolar tort law paradigm. Recall that under the traditional
tort/corrective justice model, the case should focus on the particular parties,
their relative moral position, and the particular facts as they affect the particu-
lar parties before the court.
a. Cause-in-Fact
One way in which the law has guarded the traditional tort model is its
requirement that there be a sufficiently close factual causal connection between
the defendant's action and the plaintiff's injury. That is, the defendant must be
a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries. The "but for" test is the traditional
test that courts have used to determine cause-in-fact: can the plaintiff establish
that but for the defendant's particular alleged tortious act the plaintiff would
have avoided his or her particular alleged injury?73 Of course, the traditional
plaintiffmust prove cause-in-fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
Proving cause-in-fact requires the plaintiff to identify the wrongdoer.
This may not always be possible. Which cigarette company caused the plain-
tiff's lung cancer when the plaintiff smoked several brands over many years?
A similar problem led some states to adopt market share liability in diethyl-
73. DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 168-69; see also David W. Robertson, The Common Sense
of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765-68 (1997) (discussing but-for causation at length).
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stibesterol (DES) cases. 4 However, the theory has not been widely adopted
beyond that product, although it clearly seems to have had an effect in the
settlement ofthe tobacco cases. For present purposes, the point is that a market
share theory may strain the bounds of credulity in an individual's tort case.
The equities ofthe case maybe such that a court will be hesitant to adopt such
a deviation from the traditional tort model. But, when a governmental entity
sues for a broader range of injury caused by the defendants' activity, the market
share causation theory may be much more compelling.
Alternatively, exposure to some product or toxin may increase the chance
of an individual developing some adverse health consequence. Suppose expo-
sure to the defendant's product increased the risk of developing lung cancer
by 15%. Suppose further that the background risk of developing lung cancer
was 25%. The background risks would cause 25 out of 100 people to develop
lung cancer. Of the 100 smokers exposed to the defendant's product, assume
40 developed lung cancer (unrealistically assuming away synergistic causa-
tion). Who (i.e., which 15 of the 40) developed cancer because of the defen-
dant's product and who developed it because of the background risks? In
individual tort suits, the equities might be such that a court will deny recovery.
The plaintif simply cannot clear the cause-in-fact hurdle without some rather
radical alterations to traditional tort law rules. 5
However, in the given community, the evidence would be clearer that 3/8
(15/40) of the total lung cancer losses were attributable to the defendant's
product. Although one cannot say that but for the defendant's wrong the
individual plaintiff would not have developed cancer, one can say that but for
the defendant's wrong, 3/8 of the lung cancer costs in the relevant community
would not have been incurred. Allowing each cancer victim to recover 3/8 of
his or her losses accomplishes the same end, but somewhat less efficiently and
consistently. Not forcing the defendant to take account of those costs would
inefficiently underdeter. Thus, although there might be reasons in a tradi-
tional individual tort suit to deny recovery, those reasons are much less sig-
nificant in the public tort suit. The public tort suit allows society to see the
cause-in-fact forest, whereas traditional tort suits quite properly focus on the
trees. The potential problem of always and only focusing on the trees is that
the critical deterrence gain provided by stepping back and looking at the forest
may be lost.
74. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980); Hymovitz v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069,1078 (N.Y. 1989).
75. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Com-
ment on the Twerski-SebokPlan for Administering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun
Manufacturers, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 1411 (2000) (expressing reservations about desirability and
practicality of proportional causation and recovery); Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok,
Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact asApplied to Handgun Lia-
bility, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379 (2000) (advocating proportional causation and recovery).
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To summarize, statistical evidence of cause-in-fact may not be suffi-
ciently persuasive to establish that a particular plaintiff suffered injury from
a particular action. But, that same statistical evidence maybe sufficiently per-
suasive to establish that some portion of the total injuries from a particular
condition or disease were caused-in-fact by a defendant. What may not be
obvious in a particular case is apparent across a broad range of cases.
b. Proximate or Legal Cause
This same broadview may also overcome certain legal cause ordutyissues
that impede recovery inindividualtort suits. Atthe legal cause or scope of duty
phase of the trial, the court decides whether the particular defendant owes the
particular plaintiff a duty to protect against the particular risk at issue. Put
differently, should this defendant be liable to this plaintiff for the injury that
occurred in this manner? To Judge Cardozo in the Palsgraf76 case, the duty
inquiry was fact specific, i.e., was the specific risk to the specific plaintiff
foreseeable? Likewise, in a case or jurisdiction where the decision about proxi-
mate or legal cause is leftto the jury, the inquiry often gets very specific. Under
the corrective justice model, the inquiry absolutely ought to be case specific.
Additionally, the policy analysis at the heart ofthe legal cause or scope of duty
stage should be case specific. Once again, the relevant question is whether this
plaintiff should recover from this defendant under these circumstances. In
many instances, the manner in which the injury arose might be so unforeseeable
and bizarre that liability to the particular plaintiffwould be unjustifiable.
For instance, in a suit against the manufacturer of a firearm, the interven-
tion of a third party criminal's act may be so egregious or bizarre that liability
would not be justified. However, in the public tort suit, when one steps back
from the details of particular cases and considers the general foreseeability of
third party criminal acts (instead of the foreseeability of a particular criminal
act), liability may be justified. In other words, some case specific equities or
applications may counsel against liabilityto a particular plaintiffunder particu-
lar facts. However, when stepping back and generalizing risk inthe public tort
suit, liability maybe justified for purposes of efficient deterrence.
Because the legal cause or scope of duty issue is where much of tort
law's critical policy analysis occurs, this is a particularly appropriate place to
consider three arguments for limiting liability in public tort suits. Two such
arguments are the doctrine of remoteness and the rule that purely economic
loss is not recoverable in tort. The third argument is derived from the holding
in City of Flagstaff, which states that funds expended on public services are
not recoverable in a public nuisance action."
76. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
77. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983).
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First, the doctrine of remoteness is merely a label for "no liability."78 It
is a conclusion with an amorphous, often hard to explain, content. Under one
generally accepted test for proximate cause, the negligent defendant is only
liable for those injuries or damages which it causes directly.79 Alternatively,
damages that are not sufficiently direct are remote and a defendant's conduct
is not a proximate cause of remote damages. Thus "remote" is simply the
legal opposite of "direct."
To say that damages are remote is merely a conclusion, but it is often not
a wholly logical conclusion. Intuition plays a role when a jury decides where
to draw the line between remote and direct damages. Critically, the direct
cause test for proximate cause was born at a time when courts focused more on
the temporal relationships between the defendant's act and the plaintiff's
injury, i.e., how much time passed and what other cause intervened after the
defendant's negligent act occurred? This focus on the temporal has long been
questioned. But, the so-called "doctrine of remoteness" seeks to revive that
focus. The defendant raising the doctrine of remoteness emphasizes some
action after the defendant's alleged fault occurred, such as the personal injury
victim's smoking in a tobacco case or a third-party criminal act in a firearms
case. The argument, from a traditional doctrinal perspective focusing on legal
cause, is that the smoker's voluntary choice to smoke or the third-party crim-
inal act is a superseding cause that relieves the defendant from liability. In
scope-of-duty phraseology, the claim is that the defendant's duty does not
include the risk ofthe smoker's smoking or the third party criminal's shooting.
But why not? While the arguments are based on traditional notions oftort law
that are perhaps relevant to the individual's suit, they are much less relevant to
the public tort suit. The doctrine ofremoteness is no response to the arguments
made above about the general deterrence advantages of the public tort suit.
Applying the benefits of generalizing risks to this doctrinal context, what may
appear "remote" at the level of the particular case may become sufficiently
direct (or foreseeable) from a policy perspective when viewed more broadly."
78. As one court has rather eloquently written:
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the "remoteness" doctrine.
Defendants are confused: no such independent doctrine exists. "Remoteness" as
the term is used in legal doctrine and in the cases cited by Defendants, either relates
to, and is merely an element of, whether a plaintiff properly has standing to bring
a claim or whether a plaintiff has shown the existence of proximate causation as an
element of a specific claim.
White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (N.D. Ohio 2000); see also Sills v. Smith
& Wesson, 2000 WL 33113806 (Del. Super. 2000) (denying motion to dismiss based in part
on remoteness).
79. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 184 (discussing direct causation and foreseeabilty).
80. On the issue offoreseeability of general harm, see generally David Kaiiys, The Origin
andDevelopmentofthe GovernmentalHandgun Cases,32 CoNN.L.REV. 1163,1164-69(2000).
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In the context of the firearm litigation, a related aspect of the doctrine of
remoteness is stressed. There is a notion, somewhat related to the underpin-nings of the economic harm rule, that derivative claims arising from injury to-
nonparties should not be allowed. Thus, when a defendant causes injury to a
third person, the plaintiff who suffers some injury as a result of the third per-
son's injury may not recover; arguably, the plaintiff's injuries are too remote.8 '
Pointing to the United States Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine of
remoteness in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.,2 Kimball and
Olson cite the following three part test for determining if injuries are too
remote:
(1) there are more direct victims of the alleged wrongdoing who can be
expected to act as "private attorney general"; (2) because itwillbe difficult
to apportion damages, the court will be forced to "adopt complicated
apportionment rules" to avoid multiple recoveries; and (3) because the
causal connection is attenuated, it will be difficult to define what propor-
tion of the plaintiff's damages are attributable to the defendant's conduct.1
Turning first to the expected direct victim suit, under the deterrence
theory of the public tort suit the so-called "direct victims" are not more likely
to sue for damages than is the governmental entity in its derivative suits. The
basis of the deterrence theory in the public tort suit is that all those injured
will not sue or recover because either their claims are too small or because
there is some legal impediment to recovery. Moreover, even when suit is
likely, recovery is unlikely because of the difficulty of proving cause-in-fact
or proximate cause. Or, recovery might be unlikely because of some defense
applicable in the individual suit, which, across the broad spectrum of claims,
creates an externality. Additionally, the direct victim arguments have no rele-
vance at all to the damages suffered by the government in its own capacity,
rather than in its derivative capacity. Finally, the law recognizes many deriv-
ative claims, such as wrongful death claims and loss of consortium claims.
Second, if damages are extremely difficult to apportion, recovery should
not be allowed. However, courts have long distinguished fact of injury from
the amount of allowable damages. Once fact of injury is established, plaintiffs
are allowed greater leeway in proving amount of damages. Moreover, the
difficulty of apportioning damages may not be the same across the spectrum
of public torts. In some cases, difficulty of apportionment may prove fatal to
the claim. In other cases, it may not be a factor at all.
81. Kimball &Olson, supra note 16, at 1288.
82. 503 U.S. 258 (1992); see also Serv. Employees Int'l Union Health & Welfare Fund
v. Phillip Morris Inc., 249 F3d 1068, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dismissing tobacco claims as too
renote).
83. Kimball & Olson, supra note 16, at 1290-91 (citing Holmes v. See. Investor Prot
Corp., 503 U.S. 258,268 (1992)).
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Third, the attenuation of the causal connection may be precisely the
reason why recovery is denied in an individual case. But, when viewed more
broadly across a range of claims, the causal connection is not attenuated at all.
It may indeed be compelling. Thus, it is predictable that defendants and their
lawyers would zealously attempt to shift the focus from the general to the
specific.
As noted, the direct/remote test for proximate or legal cause has a respect-
able intellectual tradition. So does the foreseeable risk test. From the defen-
dant's perspective in the public tort suits, the direct/remote test is preferable to
the foreseeable risk test. This is because the direct/remote test encourages the
court to focus on intervening actors and to decide if those intervening actors
break the causal chain. The foreseeable risk test is less appealing; it allows the
plaintiff to argue that the risk was foreseeable because the defendant should
have foreseen the intervention that led to the ultimate harm The fact that
several courts have adopted the doctrine of remoteness in rejecting public tort
suits is a testament to the ability of defense counsel to shape the issues in their
clients' favor. This effort to shape the issues is the essence of proximate cause
battles.
While Kimball and Olson distill a three part test from Holmes, others
articulate a six part test. 4 One of the elements of the six part test is whether
the type of the plaintiffs alleged injury is consistent with the purposes of tort
law.85 My claim for the legitimacy of the public tort suit is that it may have
a positive deterrent effect upon the conduct of certain defendants. The gov-
ernmental plaintiff's injury, both derivative and independent, directly relates
to the deterrent purpose of tort law.
Professor Victor Schwartz has written a series of articles in which he
attempts to develop the contours of the remoteness doctrine.86 Analyzing
some of the older cases that denied recovery based on remoteness, he identi-
fies four factors that support the remoteness doctrine. They are as follows:
(1) intervening acts between the defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury;
(2) the possibility of duplicate recovery for the same harm; (3) the prevention
84. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Bereta U.S-A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta U.S- Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d
245 (D.N.J. 2000). in Camden Couny, the court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring its negligence claims because it could not establish proximate cause, i.e., its claims were
too remote. Camden County, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 256-64. In so holding, it relied upon the six
Holmes factors. Id. But see White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (ND. Ohio 2000)
(refusing to dismiss under doctrine of remoteness).
85. Camden County, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 259.
86. Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A Rationale for a Rational Limit on
Tort Liability, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 759 (2000) [hereinafter Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctbine];
Victor E. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine: A RationalLimit on TortLaw, 8 CORNELL J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 421 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, A RationalLimit].
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of an avalanche of claims; and (4) that indirect economic harm suggests
remoteness.' These four factors are related to Kimball and Olson's three
factors, as well as to the six factor test.
Turningto Schwartz's first factor, the relevance ofintervening acts should
not be determinative. The more foreseeable an intervening act, the more
compelling the claim for the imposition of liability. When the intervening act
is the very risk that makes the defendant's action dangerous, liability is a com-
pelling conclusion. Keeping with one ofthe themes of this piece, it is possible
that intervening acts may lead to a finding of no liability in an individual suit
against a defendant. However, for deterrence purposes, when the class of
intervening acts is viewed across the panorama of all injuries arising from the
defendant's conduct, liability becomes appropriate.
Schwartz's second factor is the possibility of duplicate recovery for the
same harm. From a deterrence perspective, duplicate recovery is a troubling
fact. Double recovery leads to overdeterrence, a result that is obviously
inconsistent with the deterrence theory for the public tort suit.
Next, Schwartz argues that the remoteness doctrine prevents an ava-
lanche of claims. From a deterrence perspective, the efficiency of any deter-
rence system must depend upon its costs. If the cost of the system is greater
than its benefits, including deterrence, then the system is not worth the cost.
Thus, if a legal rule provides deterrence, but it costs more to administer than
the gain it provides, then the rule is not worth the cost. However, whether or
not an avalanche of claims is justified from a deterrence perspective depends
upon empirical data that may differ from claim to claim and case to case.
Although the simplest way to get rid of an avalanche of tort claims would be
to eliminate tort liability altogether, no one has seriously proposed that option.
When a defendant's conduct causes great and serious injury, an avalanche of
claims may be the perfectly appropriate response. More particularly, when
analyzing public tort suits in light of the avalanche concern, one should bear
in mind that although public tort suits are large, complex cases and the num-
ber of governmental plaintiffs is limited, the number of individual claimants
is much larger. Thus, although the overall cost of public tort suits must be
determined to assess whether each public tort suit will provide a deterrence
gain, the fear of an avalanche of claims does not seem realistic.
Schwartz's final factor is that indirect economic harm suggests remote-
ness. This factor is a slight restatement of the economic harm rule that I will
discuss separately. Critically, with all the remoteness factors and analyses,
the issue becomes whether the factors counseling against liability outweigh
the factors pointing towards liability, such as the deterrence rationale for the
public tort suit. Even though some of the remoteness factors point toward no
87. Schwartz, The Remoteness Doctrine, supra note 86, at 762-64; Schwartz, A Rational
Limit, supra note 86, at 426-28.
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liability in suits filed by individuals (perhaps for corrective justice reasons),
are those same reasons any less persuasive in the public tort suit?
Notably, several courts in the firearms context have refused to dismiss
governmental suits under the doctrine of remoteness, at least at the pleading
stage.88 Those courts tended to look at the causation issue from a broad
perspective, noting that the general foreseeability of the crime alleged by the
plaintiffs caused the injury.
c. The Economic Harm Rule
What about the rule that purely economic damages are not recoverable
in tort (or at least not in negligence)? This rule has always puzzled me. 9
Perhaps it has a place if a plaintiff, in a case in which contract norms are im-
plicated, seeks to recover in tort some damages not recoverable in contract.
Likewise, it has a place when recovery duplicates damages another other party
has already recovered.91 Outside these and perhaps other limited contexts,
why limit recovery? Indeed, there are many exceptions to the rule. Wrongful
death recovery for loss of support is an exception, as is loss of consortium.
Recovery for legal or accountant malpractice is another exception. Many
misrepresentation cases involve purely economic loss. So does interference
with contract. From a deterrence perspective, if a defendant tortiously causes
economic loss to another, a rule which shields that defendant from any liabil-
ity for that loss is inefficient.'
The holding in City of Flagstaff, which states that money expended on
public services by a governmental entity is not recoverable in a public nui-
sance action, is subject to similar criticism.' If the defendant causes the
public entity to incur costs it otherwise would not have incurred, then the
failure to allow recovery ofthose costs will lead to inefficient deterrence. The
argument that public entities exist to provide public services is a confusing
88. See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823-26 (ND. Ohio
2000); Sills v. Smith & Wesson, 2000 WL 33113806 (Del. Super. 2000) (dismissing negligent
marketing and distribution claims and unjust enrichment claims, but not plaintiffs' other
claims).
89. Thomas C. Gailigan, Jr., supra note 52, at 522-25 (comparing recovery of economic
loss in tort and contract); see also Galligan, supra note 48, at 43-53 (discussing economic harm
rule).
90. Galligan, supra note 52, at 512-20.
91. Id.
92. Indeed, the economic loss rule may not apply in the public nuisance context See,
e.g., Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Law, Inc., 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir. 1982) (acknowledging
precedent allowing recovery of lost profits in nuisance actions).
93. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983).
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response. So what? Public services traceable to a defendant's torts ought to
be recoverable in order to encourage efficient investments in safety.94
d. Victim Fault and the Public Tort Suit
Now, it is useful to slightly alter the inquiry from legal cause and scope
of duty to defenses. One of the objections to the public tort suit is that it
bypasses defenses available against individual plaintiffs, such as victim fault
and assumption of risk. Others argue, however, that this very fact is actually
one of the public law suit's strengths.95 I have noted that the more general risk
focus of the public tort suit may provide a deterrence gain when individual
recovery may not be justified, most often in cases in which the individual
plaintiff cannot establish cause-in-fact or legal cause.'
Significantly, the public tort suit also may be particularly appropriate
when one considers the plaintiffs fault and its effect upon recovery and deter-
rence. One of the tort revolutions of the twentieth century was the widespread
adoption of comparative fault inthe United States.97 Currently, in most states,
the plaintiff's fault will not automatically bar recovery. Instead, it reduces
recovery in most cases. There are several comparative fault regimes in Amer-
ica.9" Under pure comparative fault, the plaintiff's fault will reduce recovery
by the percentage of that plaintiff's fault. Assuming one plaintiff and one de-
fendant who bears all fault not allocated to the plaintiff; the 10% at fault plain-
tiff will recover 90%; a 50% at fault plaintiff will recover 5 0%; a 51% at fault
plaintiff will recover 49%; and a 90% at fault plaintiff will recover 10%.
Another type of comparative fault is called "modified" comparative fault.
Under the modified approach, the plaintiff's fault reduces recovery until it
reaches a specified level. Once it reaches that level, the plaintiff recovers
nothing. There are two basic types of modified comparative fault in America.
Under one, plaintiffs recovery is reduced unless it is "as great as or greater
than" defendant's fault. Once plaintiff's fault is "as great as" defendant's fault,
plaintiff recovers nothing. Under the other modified comparative fault system,
plaintiffs recovery is reduced until its fault is "greater than" defendant's fault.
Once plaintiff s fault reaches that level, recovery is barred.
Thus, under the first modified approach, again assuming one defendant
bears all fault not allocated to the plaintiff, the 10% at fault plaintiff recovers
94. But see Kimball & Olson, supra note 16, at 1296-1301 (arguing against right of
recovery of costs of public services).
95. See, e.g., Vandall, supra note 13, at 478-81 (noting that switch from claims based on
subrogation to claims based on unjust enrichment or statutory games precluded tobacco com-
panies from using certain defenses).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 73-87 (analyzing cause-in-fact issues).
97. DOBBs, supra note 3, § 201.
98. Id. at 505-06.
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90%. The 50% at fault plaintiff recovers nothing. Likewise, any plaintiff
whose fault is greater than the defendant's fault recovers nothing. Under the
second modified approach, the 50% at fault plaintiff recovers 50%. The 51%
or greater at fault plaintiff recovers nothing. The critical difference betweenthe
modified approaches is in the 50/50 case, where plaintiff is 50% at fault and
defendant is 50% at fault. In the "not as great as" state, the plaintiff recovers
nothing when his fault is 50%, but in the "not greater than" state, the plaintiff
recovers 50%. Giventhe common sense ofthe 50/50 split ina difficult case, the
difference in the two modified approaches may be significant to the plaintiff.
But, what effect does comparative fault have on deterrence and where do
public torts fit in? First, imagine a private law suit in a jurisdiction where
plaintiff's fault is still a bar to recovery. Assume that a fact finder would have
allocated 5% ofthe faultto plaintiffand 95% ofthe faultto defendant, andthat
the plaintiff suffered $100,000 in damages. Under comparative fault princi-
ples, the defendant would be responsible for $95,000 of the plaintiff's dam-
ages. But, under the applicable contributory negligence regime, the defendant
would pay nothing. Consequently, deterrence theory tells us that the defendant
would have no economic incentive to take account of damages it caused to an
at-fault plaintiff because it will never have to pay those damages. In such a
state, the public tort suit may have a positive deterrent effect. It would allow
recovery inthe amount ofthe damage caused bythe defendant, but not recover-
able by the individual plaintiff. Although recovery of $95,000 might not be
significant, when one considers all the damages caused by defendants that they
do not need to pay for, nor take account of, because of the contributory negli-
gence rule, the deterrence gain of the public tort suit is apparent.
Similar claims for the public tort suit can be made in modified compara-
tive fault jurisdictions. Under any of the comparative fault regimes discussed
above, the defendant in the 50//95% hypothetical would be liable to plaintiff
for $95,000. This potential liability would have a positive deterrent effect
because it provides an incentive to invest efficiently in safety when the defen-
dant decides what to do, how to do it, and how often to do it.
But; let us assume a modified comparative fault jurisdiction in which
plaintiff was 51% at fault, defendant was 49% at fault, and plaintiff suffered
$100,000 in damages. No matter which ofthetwotypes ofmodified compara-
tive fault is applied, the plaintiff would recover nothing - plaintiff's fault was
both "as great as" and "greater than" defendant's fault. The adverse impact on
efficient deterrence is apparent. Eventhoughthe defendant, under comparative
fault principles, caused $49,000 of the plaintiffs damages, the defendantneed
not pay them. Thus, the defendant will not consider those damages as a cost
of its activity and will not take them into account when making decisions about
whether to engage in the relevant activity. Under a pure comparative fault
regime, the defendant pays $49,000 in damages. That potential liability pro-
vides defendants with an incentive to behave safely when facing situations in
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which the negligence of the defendant and plaintiff combine to cause an
injury.99 At the least, the defendant could not ignore that $49,000 in damages.
Of what relevance is this discussion to the public tort suit? In a modified
comparative fault regime or a contributory negligence regime, a defendant is
not liable to a plaintiff under some circumstances, even though it might be
said that the defendant was causally responsible for some of the plaintiff's
injuries. In the relevant jurisdiction, it might be said that normatively when
a plaintiff was either at fault (contributory negligent) or over some specified
level of fault (modified comparative), it is not fair for the plaintiff to recover
from the defendant. The relevant jurisdiction sacrifices some of the deterrent
effect of liability in individual suits because of the normative or corrective
justice aspects of the particular cases. However, the public lawsuit might
provide a vehicle whereby the defendant must take account of damages, but
in which an individual plaintiff may not recover because of plaintiff's fault or
the level of that fault.
Imagine a defendant who caused $1,000,000,000 in damages to a group
of plaintiffs who were 5 1% ° at fault in a contributory negligence or modified
comparative fault regime. The hypothetical plaintiffs will recover $0, yet it
can be said that the defendant is responsible for $490,000,000 in damages; a
sum that will no doubt impact society as well as the individual plaintiffs in the
group. One may be persuaded that the equities of the individual cases are
such that given the values inherent in the applicable contributory negligence
or comparative fault regime, no individual recovery is justified. One could
also argue rather persuasively that a public tort suit, in which the applicable
governmental entity recovers the $490,000,000 damages (caused by defen-
dants but not recoverable by individual plaintiffs), provides a deterrence gain.
The threat of such a suit and its accompanying liability provide an incentive
for defendants to invest efficiently in safety.
e. Recap on Deterrence and the Public Tort Suit
Similar to cause-in-fact and proximate cause issues, these arguments
about deterrence, the public tort suit, and victim fault rely on the differences
between individual suits (and the inherent equities in those suits), as well as
public tort suits focusing on deterrence across a broad class of claims. To
reiterate, the public tort suit that deals with a broad spectrum of injuries (to a
99. See generally Lewis A. Kombauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing DamagesAmong
Multiple Torifeasors, 98 YAIE L.i. 831 (1989) (discussing rules of apportionment and their
effects).
100. Assuming that all plaintiffs are 51% at fault is a simplified assumption. Some may
be more at fault and some may be less, but I oversimplify to make the general point that there
may be significant differences in individual victims' fault. This may require a significant
investment in judicial resources that would undermine the efficiency gains in public tort suits,
or courts might rely on broad statistical proof about victims' fault
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city, state, or nation) may provide a deterrence gain by forcing defendants to
take account of those damages that the defendant "caused," but that are not
recoverable in individual (traditional) tort cases because of the narrow focus
of the case, corrective justice, and/or the equities of the individual case.
Professor Matsuda states the following: 'We could establish a legal principle
of causation that says that if the party most proximate to the harm is less likely
to be deterred by imposition of liability than other causal agents less proxi-
mate, then the others less proximate shall be considered a proximate cause of
the harm.' 01 Echoing Judge Calabresi, Professor Matsuda goes on to note
that the law should hold the person in the best position to prevent the harm
accountable for it.'" In my scheme, a public tort suit may be appropriate
when a defendant is in a position to prevent some harm and an individual
plaintiff's recovery is either unlikely, impossible, or when the defendant's
failure to prevent the harm leads to some harm (cost) to the governmental
plaintiff. In such cases, taking a broad view of the foreseeability of the harm
and finding it to be the proximate cause of the relevant harm arguably pro-
vides a net deterrence gain.
As noted, there may be objections to the broad focus ofthe public tort suit
and its reliance on statistical evidence. However, it seems that a general risk
assessment focus is exactly the type of analysis that a person might engage in
when deciding whether or how to make a certain product. The analysis would
be broad, not case specific.
From a power perspective, the public tort suit equalizes the relative
strength of the parties. The suit is one powerful entity - a governmental
entity - against another, a large entity or group of entities. It is not an individ-
ual plaintiff versus a large entity or group of entities; it is large versus large. 3
To the unsophisticated observer, the public tort suit may look more like a fair
fight between powerful organizations. The critic might query whether class
actions do the same thing. The clear and emphatic answer must be no.
A class action is an aggregation of individual claims. The claims are ag-
gregated, in oversimplified terms, only if common issues of law and fact
predominate over particular issues. The public tort suit is the governmental
entity's claim for damages. It is not an aggregation of individual claims. Thus,
even when a class action may be inappropriate, a public tort suit might be a
logical alternative.
Imagine a purported class action seeking to impose market share liability
on a manufacturer. Further assume that in the relevant jurisdiction, a manu-
facturer can avoid market share liability by establishing that it did not produce
101. Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2195,2211(2000).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 42, at 1260 (opining that potential costs of defending
suits may have brought firearms' manufacturers to settlement table).
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the particular product that injured the particular plaintiff.o'4 Might the court
in such a jurisdiction refuse to certify a class because individual issues about
whether defendants can prove that they did not supply the product to a particu-
lar plaintiffpredominate over common issues? Possibly. In such a case, there
would be no class action, but a public tort suit would not be subject to the
same objections. The public tort suit could proceed.
V1 A Few Practical Issues with the Public Tort Suit
Finally, I turn to some practical is sues that public tort suits raise; practi-
cal issues that may counsel caution in particular cases. The first issue relates
to separation of powers. Is the public tort suit inappropriate because it might
lead to a liability not imposed by the legislature? Quite simply, the answer is
no. Absent proper legislative prohibition, the public tort suit is nothing more
than a garden-variety tort suit. °5 In most common law jurisdictions there is
no express authorization for tort suits; those suits are allowed, defined, and
refined by the judiciary. Moreover, when the executive commences such a
suit, the executive is asserting itself in the tort arena. Itis asking thejudiciary
to decide a basic liability issue. The separation of powers doctrine does not
seem to require legislative authorization for the public tort suit."° Although
the issue is a serious one,"° so is the extent to which a public tort suit might
improve the efficient operation of deterrence.
A second practical issue is the concern with avoiding double recovery.
A court deciding a public tort suit must be careful to avoid awarding the same
104. See, e.g., Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368-80 (Wash. 1984); Sindell v. Abbott
Labs., 607 P-2d 924, 936-38 (Cal. 1980).
105. After the commencement of municipality suits against firearm manufacturers, some
states passed statutes to bar the pending suits. These statutes raise critical constitutional issues
about ex post facto laws, among other concerns. See, e.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
785 So. 2d 1 (La. 2001) (holding LA. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1799, which precluded local
government authorities from suing various firearm manufacturers and related entities, constitu-
tional).
106. See Kairys, supra note 80, at 1173-74 (arguing that courts merely need to apply well
established tort law in order to allow suits against gun manufacturers to proceed); see also
Kairys, supra note 23, at 1181 ("Protecting the public by monitoring dangerous or threatening
activities or conduct, determining what conduct constitutes a public nuisance, and seeking im-
mediate relief is among the highest powers and duties of executive officials."). But see White
v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (rejecting contention that suits
against gun manufacturers violates separation of powers); Robert A. Levy, The New Business
of Government Sponsored Litigation, 9 KAN. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 592 (2000) (arguing that
substituting government-sponsored litigation for failed legislation violates principle of separa-
tion of powers). See generally Lytton, supra note 42 (arguing that tort system complements
rather than usurps legislative or executive authority).
107. See, e.g., James H. WarnerMunicipalAnti-Gun Lawsuits: How Questionable Litiga-
tion Substitutesfor Legislation, 10 SEToN HALL CoNST. L.J. 775, 778 (2000).
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damages twice. For instance, imagine the plaintiff in a public tort suit seeking
recovery for medical expenses incurred by the public entity as a result of a
mass tort. After recovery of those damages, assume an individual who re-
ceived public assistance to pay some of his medical expenses, filed suit
against the tortfeasor. Normally, under the collateral source rule, the individ-
ual plaintiff could recover the medical expenses paid by the governmental
entity."° However, if both the governmental entity andthe individual recover
for the medical expenses, the same damages will be awarded twice. There
will not only be overcompensation; there will also be overdeterrence. Conse-
quently, courts must be cautious to avoid this double recovery problem. In the
hypothetical asserted, denying the individual plaintdfs recovery is a deviation
from the traditional collateral source rule, but it is critical to insure optimal,
but not overdeterrence.
What if individuals recover in tort before the public tort suit is filed?
Then, the judge hearing the public tort suit must reduce the state's recovery
by the amount already recovered by individual plaintiffs. Although this
marshaling is necessary to avoid overdeterrence, it could take a lot of time.
Moreover, somewhat ironically, it requires that the court hear the public tort
suit in numerous particular victim recovery analyses. These mandated analy-
ses are somewhat ironic in that one of the supposed strengths of the public tort
suit is avoiding such victim specific analysis. Consequently, the most admin-
istratively efficient arenas for public tort suits are areas in which individual
recovery has not been common. Prior to the state suits against tobacco manu-
facturers, individual recovery was extremely rare. Likewise, individual recov-
ery from firearm manufacturers was not the rule. Perhaps, public tort suits in
these areas were responses to imperfections caused by the prior no-liability
decisions.
What effect would the widespread adoption of several liability, as
opposed to joint and several liability, have on a public tort suit? Obviously,
it depends upon the particular several liability regime. Conceivably, several,
but not joint, liability requires the allocation of fault to individual victims and
others. This might result in a significant administrative expense and one
would have to compare the amount of that expense to the deterrence gains
from the public law suit.
Another issue of significance is the compensation depletion effect of the
public tort suit. If governmental entities recover, will defendants be unable
to pay individual claimants? Should governmental entities recovery prime
individual recovery? These are difficult issues. However, like individual tort
suits, one underlying premise of the governmental tort suit is that the govern-
ment has suffered injury. Thus, a central question is: should the government
go uncompensated? Additionally, at least some ofthe damages governmental
108. See DOBBS, supra note 3, at 1058-61 (discussing collateral source rule).
58 WASH. &LEEL REV 1019 (2001)
entities seek to recover are for expenditures from the public fise to deal with
individual injuries, such as medical expenses or other public assistance
payments. Finally, should defendants avoid liability to a governmental entity
because liability might mean that a future individual's judgment against the
defendant may not be satisfied in full if that individual sued?
Based on the questions raised above, one might cry out - what limit?
Why should the deterrence gain from liability be limited to public tort suits?
Could anyone sue and would liability potentially have a deterrence gain? I
have written something along those very lines as an argument in favor of
punitive damages or augmented awards. 9 But, conglomerating those claims
in the public tort suit avoids the problems of rent-seeking and assures recovery
of public damages.
VH. Conclusion
The public tort suit is a new breed of claim. It is different from the
bipolar tort suit to which we have become accustomed. The public tort suit
has the potential to assure efficient deterrence. It might assure efficient deter-
rence in areas in which individual suits are not brought or in which corrective
justice demands no liability to individual plaintiffs.
The public tort suit promises to be particularly appropriate in cases in
which all those injured either do not sue or do not recover. Public tort suits
might provide an efficiency gain in cases in which individual plaintiffs cannot
establish cause-in-fact or legal cause under traditional, corrective justice
notions of tort law, but in which cause-in-fact and legal cause are more clearly
established across a broad range of claims. The deterrence gains ofthe public
tort suit are also apparent when one considers the fact that victim fault may
point towards no recovery in individual suits, but that the applicable victim
fault rule, while encouraging individual responsibility, might result in an
overall deterrence loss. The public tort suit can account for that loss. Consis-
tently, when an effective vehicle for efficiently improving safety is developed,
courts or legislatures tend to adopt it over time."0 Time will tell if the same
is true for the public tort suit.
109. See Galligan, supra note 48, at 72-73 (discussing alternative plaintiffs seeking aug-
mented awards).
110. See, e.g., Turner v. NOPSI, 476 So. 2d. 800, 807 (La. 1985) (Dennis, 3., concurring)
("As a practical matter, whenever a superior economic alternative has been presented, our
society has shown itself ready to abandon the view that justice requires individual injurers to
pay their victims solely on the basis of fault").
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